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Abstract Ambitious renewable energy targets and an aging infrastructure neces-
sitate a substantial upgrading and expansion of the electricity networks around
Europe and beyond. Although vital for the functioning of the economy and a green
energy future, grid development projects are often met by public opposition, which
increase costs and lead to lengthy planning processes. Therefore, understanding the
social aspects of a green energy economy is becoming increasingly important. The
current planning frameworks have proven ineffective at resolving conflicts among
stakeholders, indicating the need for a new approach. We analyse these issues from
an economic perspective, outlining the economic characteristics of transmission
developments and public engagement. We identify previously overlooked features
of the planning process that contribute to the rise in conflicts, public opposition and
prolonged project realisation. The Scottish Beauly–Denny high voltage transmission
development is discussed in detail and our findings indicate a need for better
engagement with local communities at an earlier stage of planning. Trust between
communities, developers and government is important for the negotiations and can
be achieved through transparency, specific education and set guidelines for stake-
holder engagement in the planning process.
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1 Introduction
The future of energy networks holds important technical, economic, and social
challenges. Across Europe, the electricity grids are in need of modernisation to
support the ongoing development of low carbon energy systems. In order to connect
the large number of emerging renewable energy plants and integration of energy
markets the networks need to expand. This holds across both distribution and
transmission networks.1 Meanwhile, larger development projects such as expansion
of transmission networks tend to dominate the public debate, much due to their
greater impact in terms of national importance, economic costs, environmental
impacts, as well as their negative effect on neighbouring communities.
Network developers face a number of constraints which may extend the planning
process and delay a project—considering alternative project designs, negotiations
with the regulator to justify the need case and cost efficiency, environmental
constraints which will have to be considered, or a change in government policy—
are a few of the potential issues. The focus of the present paper is on public and
community opposition and, although not a new issue, it is proving to be an
increasingly important aspect in planning and development of grid projects.
Objections to large projects often relate to environmental, visual and health
aspects (Soini et al. 2011), particularly from communities in close proximity to a
planned development. Failure to agree between stakeholders leads to costly delays
or even causes projects to be abandoned altogether. As a result, the potential for
reaching the targets set for reducing carbon emissions and climate change, thus a
green energy future, is in jeopardy (European Commission 2008).
Grid development projects tend to affect a number of stakeholders—from state
and local communities to NGOs, landowners and corporations—each with different
objectives and perceptions of the project and surrounding matters. The existing
decision-making processes and institutions have proven ineffective at resettling
conflicts that appear between stakeholders, causing uncertainty and delays.
Increased information provision and public engagement in transmission grid
planning can increase public trust in network companies, public acceptance and
therefore accelerate the realisation of new grid developments (RGI 2012; Newig and
Kvarda 2012; Cotton and Devine-Wright 2010). The Aarhus Convention (European
Community signed and implemented in 1998 and 2003 respectively) advocates
early and effective public participation to increase the transparency of the planning
and decision-making process.
Public engagement implies the involvement of members of the public in policy-
forming and policy development. The concept is not new but is becoming
increasingly important in infrastructural developments. For example, a recent
United Nations legal tribunal found that the UK government had failed to provide
sufficient information and decision-making powers to the public regarding two
major wind developments (UN 2014).
1 The development of distributed generation sources and demand for electric vehicles, among others, is
exerting pressure on the distribution networks to take on a new role as active networks compared to a
previously passive role (Poudineh et al. 2015).
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However, despite the pressure through the Aarhus Convention there are no
established guidelines, rules or frameworks defining how public participation ought
to be formalised. Recent high-profile projects, such as the Norwegian Hardanger
line and the Scottish Beauly–Denny line,2 show that transmission projects
increasingly involve vested social, economic and political interests. Noticeably,
there is a need for new approaches for defining and organising the role and tasks of
the actors, including the public and affected communities.
Exploring project characteristics and stakeholder relations using an economic
approach is previously untested but it can potentially generate several efficiency
improvements. Based on the seminal works by Coase (1937) and Williamson (1979)
on the role of institutions, rules, and norms, this paper analyses economic
characteristics of transmission projects following an Institutional Economics
approach. Additionally, using the contentious Beauly–Denny High Voltage
Transmission Line project and input from previous literature, this paper outlines
how public engagement may be approached to allow for a more efficient planning
process.
The paper is outlined as follows: Sect. 2 outlines the analytical framework and
the economic characteristics of transmission developments and public engagement.
Section 3 presents and discusses the case of the development of the Beauly–Denny
transmission line. Section 4 concludes.
2 Theoretical framework
In disputes such as those occurring between grid developers and communities,
assumptions of perfect information, costless transactions, and rationality are often
unrealistic. Traditional neoclassical theories rely heavily on these assumptions and
are therefore of limited relevance when analysing many practical issues (Wawer
2007; Coase 2000; Kumkar 1998). Classic economic theories consider commodities,
labour and consumers as the smallest units in the analysis of the relation between
the individual and forces of nature. This allows the economists to study how supply
and demand determine prices but not the factors that determine what goods and
services are traded on markets and therefore are priced. New Institutional
Economics (NIE) considers the activity between actors and the norms governing
them (i.e. transactions) as the smallest unit because these must be negotiated before
any level of production, exchange and consumption can occur (Commons 1931).
As such, NIE offers an alternative method of enquiry compared to the more
orthodox theories. NIE accepts the assumptions of profit maximisation and
efficiency but rejects those of zero transaction costs, rationality and perfect
information. Institutions refer to the rules of an economy such as formal rules (e.g.,
written rules of contractual agreements, constitutions and laws) and informal
constraints (e.g., unwritten codes of conduct, social norms of behaviour and beliefs).
2 The Hardanger transmission line, due to cross the Hardanger fjord on the Norwegian west coast, was
one of the most reported news stories in Norway in 2010. The Beauly–Denny transmission line received
over 20,000 objections and was covered extensively by UK media.
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Organisations (i.e. a group of actors bound together by a common purpose to
achieve common objectives) on the other hand are considered as the players in the
economy. Actors form institutions to reduce transaction costs and uncertainty as
they facilitate transactions and cooperative behaviour (North 1990).
Williamson (1979) argues that transaction costs depend on asset specificity,
uncertainty, opportunism, bounded rationality and frequency of transactions.
Specificity is highlighted as the most important aspect among these something
which may appear in the form of site specificity, physical asset specificity or human
asset specificity (Williamson 1981).
Reaching unanimous decisions in transmission developments is difficult due to
two main characteristics. First, the size of projects, including physical, financial, and
number of stakeholders, makes negotiation and bargaining difficult as the involved
parties have different objectives and stakes in the project. Second, many decisions
involve public goods which are difficult to quantify and therefore risks being
exploited. These characteristics lead to uncertainty, undefined and therefore
unsuccessful principal-agent relationships, as well as information asymmetries. In
turn, this generates increased transaction costs, externalities, and subsequent market
failure.
In the following sections, we analyse the issues faced by transmission
developments using the central concepts of NIE, namely transaction cost theory,
property rights theory, and agency theory.
2.1 Economic characteristics of transmission developments
The integration of high levels of renewable energy sources in electricity systems and
having effective market competition in wholesale electricity generation both require
substantial investments in new and upgraded transmission networks. At the same
time, transmission grid is a natural monopoly function and is, as a result, subject to
economic regulation and oversight by the sector regulator (Biggar and Hesamzadeh
2014). In practice, this means that over-spending or disallowed investments on new
grid projects will reduce the revenues and profits of the network utilities (Joskow
2008). The technical nature of the transmission networks means that determining
the operational and economic benefits of the grid projects can often be complex
(see, e.g., Volk 2013; Brattle Group 2013).
Transmission lines are essentially electricity highways with the purpose to
transport electricity, for example, from an area rich in resources to another where
demand outweighs supply. Areas at either end of a transmission line can enjoy
benefits from new installations, including revenues from energy production, reduced
electricity prices and a more reliable service. However, the benefits to the areas
along the lines are less obvious. Connecting renewable energy sources and reliable
networks benefit the country as a whole, yet potential costs of reduced property
prices, visual amenity, tourism and damages to wildlife are mainly borne by
communities along the line. These costs are not easily quantified as they can either
be labelled as public goods or they are not directly observable. Thus, the
construction of new transmission lines produce externalities as the local social costs
are greater than the private costs.
108 Econ Polit Ind (2016) 43:105–126
123
The planning process of grid developments is highly specific and depends on the
knowledge and experience of developers, consumers, and authorities. Reaching
unanimous decisions in transmission developments is difficult as the physical and
financial size of projects, as well as the number of stakeholders, tend to make
cooperation difficult. Public knowledge regarding electricity networks relate largely
to technical aspects, such as pylons and wires, rather than their organisations
(Devine-Wright et al. 2010). The low level of public knowledge regarding
transmission line development and administration is not only a cause of increased
public opposition to new grid projects, it also restricts increased public participation
and a more active role for communities within the development process.
Another aspect is the large number of affected communities and citizens along
the transmission lines. Although all stakeholders should have the chance to express
their views and perspectives towards a project, it would be impossible to consider
all statements and objections. The Beauly–Denny project alone received over
20,000 objections. The developer and planning authority must balance the public’s
views to be taken into account and the wider benefits of acceleration of
developments.
2.2 Economic characteristics of public engagement
Public engagement is defined as the practice of involving members of the public in
policy-forming and decision-making activities of organisations responsible for
policy development. Depending on the flow of information between the participat-
ing public and the responsible organisation, public engagement is divided into (1)
public communication; (2) public consultation; and (3) public participation. Public
communication relates to a one-way information flow from the organisation to the
public whilst public consultation considers a flow of information from the public to
the organisation. In public participation, a formal dialogue takes place and
information is exchanged between members of the public and the organisation
(Rowe and Frewer 2005). Public engagement is therefore considered in policy and
decision-making frameworks only if initiated by the responsible organisation.
However, the extent to which public engagement is allowed to influence the process
is often unclear.
Newig (2007) notes that the rationale for public participation in sustainable
environmental planning includes access to local knowledge, attitudes and accep-
tance, increased awareness, transparency and, thus, trust between stakeholders. If
properly framed, some of the lessons from environmental planning could be used to
address the opposition to and conflicts in grid development projects. Given the
similarities between sustainable environmental planning and the characteristics of
the energy sector, e.g. multiple stakeholders, public goods and market failure,
instruments of environmental governance and policy analysis such as cost-
effectiveness and social and environmental cost-benefit analysis are also applicable
to transmission developments (Think 2013; LIFE Elia 2015).
Public and community engagement in power line projects shares some features
with that of other major infrastructure developments. Such engagements have often
been discussed in the literature in the context of specific types of projects: for
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example, nuclear power plants (Otway et al. 1978), in the context of carbon capture
and storage (Kraeusel and Mo¨st 2012), wind power (e.g., Swofford and Slattery
2010) or airports (e.g., Jue et al. 1984). Recent large-scale grid projects like the
Beauly–Denny transmission line however show that the public takes an increasing
role in the realisation and success of these projects.
3 The Beauly–Denny transmission project
3.1 Background
There are two main transmission network owners (TOs) in Scotland: Scottish Hydro
Electric Transmission Ltd (SHETL), a subsidiary of Scottish and Southern Energy
plc (SSE), and Scottish Power Transmission Ltd (SPT), a subsidiary of SP Energy
Networks. Scotland’s energy policy is devolved from the UK government, and
therefore independently decides on consents for developments of energy infras-
tructures. However, the TOs in Scotland are regulated by the UK wide energy
regulator Office of the Gas and Electricity Markets (Ofgem) and National Grid, the
English TO, operates the system.
The Scottish and UK government targets of tackling climate change have
prompted an increase of renewable energy generation. The existing transmission
capacity is insufficient to allow the intended renewable energy facilities to connect
to the network. As part of their transmission licences, SHETL and SPL maintain that
they have a duty under the Electricity Act 1989 to develop and maintain an efficient,
co-ordinated and economical system of electricity transmission. This is to facilitate
competition in supply and generation of electricity. The Beauly–Denny line was
argued to be a key infrastructural development towards maintaining competition and
enable development of renewable energy.
3.2 Beauly–Denny project facts
The Beauly–Denny High Voltage Transmission Line (HTVL) is a high profile
development, subject to the longest ever public inquiry in Scotland. It has been
followed closely in media and has generated close to 20,000 objections from all
over the world. The planning process has taken 10 years from the initial
identification of the need for the project to the start of construction. Applying the
theoretical concepts outlined in Sect. 2, i.e. transaction costs, information asym-
metry, and principal-agent relationships, this case study will focus on how consumer
engagement was managed in the Beauly–Denny planning process. The project is an
example of how conflicting interests of the stakeholders delay the execution of
projects and reveals a lack of suitable a decision-making framework for such
developments. The study is based on first hand information collected through
interviews with key stakeholders and an extensive research and collection of
information published by all the relevant stakeholders.
In September 2005, SHETL and SPT applied for planning consent under
Section 37 of the Electricity Act 1989 to construct a new high voltage power-line
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between Beauly, near Inverness, and Denny, near Stirling. The project involves the
construction of a 220 km3 long 400 kV double circuit overhead transmission line set
to replace the current single circuit 132 kV transmission line, which will be
dismantled as part of the development. One circuit will operate at a voltage of
400 kV and the other at 275 kV. Further expansion and construction of substations
will also take place. Approximately 600 steel pylons between 43 and 65 m tall will
support the line, although the majority of towers are between 50 and 56 m tall. The
spacing of towers are dependent on topography, altitude and the exposure of
weather effects, such as high winds, but will normally vary in a range of 275–450 m
and they will be fixed in the ground using concrete tower foundations (SSE 2012a,
b). The Beauly–Denny project was completed and the line went live in November
2015.
The new power-line mainly follows the same route as the old 132 kV line,
however changes in the use of land in the course of time required slight deviations
(Fig. 1 illustrates the new route in relation to the old route). The 220 km long
stretch is divided into four sections, separated by the new substations. The landscape
along the line is characterised by varying land uses including remote moorland,
forests, river valleys, roads (A9) and some more populated areas.4 The routing
around the Stirling area was particularly contentious as the power-line passes close
to residential areas and near Stirling’s most famous tourist attractions: Stirling
Castle and the Wallace monument. Following the longest public inquiry in Scotland,
Scottish Ministers gave consent to the construction in 2010, provided that certain
mitigation measures were adapted. SPT worked with Stirling council to reach
agreement on an appropriate mitigation scheme and the final consent was given in
December 2011 and construction commenced in February 2012.5
3.2.1 Strategic options
Several strategic options for routing of the corridors and alternatives for achieving
the required transmission capacity were considered at the initial stage of planning.
The identification of a number of plausible routes was followed by a more detailed
analysis of technical, economic and environmental aspects. The environmental
evaluation followed the guidelines of the Holford Rules6 and aimed to achieve the
best fit within the landscape, balancing minimal effects on sensitive landscapes with
the requirement of keeping alignments more than 100 m from residential buildings.
A public consultation was exercised once an ‘optimal’ route was identified.
Undergrounding of the line was considered at early stages of the project. Although
undergrounding the line or sections of it would reduce potential visual or health
effects, it will still have a significant environmental impact. SHETL states that a
3 SHETL is responsible for 200 km and SPT is responsible for 20 km.
4 See ‘‘Appendix 1’’ for a more detailed outline.
5 See ‘‘Appendix 2’’ for a project timeline.
6 Guidelines for the construction of new high voltage overhead transmission lines. These include the
notions of avoiding major areas of high amenity value, areas of scientific interests, choosing the most
direct route and a preference for tree and hill backgrounds rather than sky (National Grid 2012).
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25 m wide corridor of land would be cleared in order to position the power-line.
Such a corridor would be needed to remain clear after construction to allow for
future access for maintenance and upgrading of the line (SSE 2012b). National Grid
Fig. 1 Overview of the Beauly–Denny power-line routing
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(2009) estimates that, using modern cable technics, undergrounding a typical
400 kV double circuit power-line will cost 12–17 times as much as installing the
same line overhead. This is mainly due to the differences in the cables themselves,
the insulation of underground cables and the construction method itself.
3.3 Stakeholders and their objectives
The difficulty in any major infrastructural development is to strike a balance
between the long-term objectives of the various stakeholders and the overall benefits
of the development. The complex nature of the planning process is largely due to
conflicting interests, information asymmetry and the various principal-agent
relationships amongst the vast range of stakeholders. Such conflicts occasion
transaction costs, further increasing the externalities of projects. This section
outlines the participants’ differing practical roles in the planning process and
discusses the theoretical underpinnings, characteristics and incentives relative to the
varied range of stakeholders. The focus is on the process in Scotland, however the
theoretical aspects, characteristics and incentives are not country specific.
3.3.1 The Scottish Government
The Scottish Government belongs to the public sector. The public sector is
characterised by a multiplicity of dimensions regarding tasks, stakeholders and
conflicting interests. A multitude of principal-agent relationships arise from dealings
related to both distributive and allocative issues. Governments generally set out to
maximise welfare rather than profits and therefore often fail to minimise costs and
maximise economic value (Libecap 1989). In particular, compared to the private
sector, incentives for efficiency in the public sector are rather weak due to the
absence of competitive situations.
The Scottish government is responsible for setting long-term targets through its
Energy Policy. It provides a framework for the authorities and is an important factor
in guiding private sector interests. In The Climate Change Act 2009, the Scottish
Government set an ambitious target for greenhouse gas emissions at reductions of
42 % by 2020 and 80 % by 2050. Scotland aims to drive technological development
and place itself at the global forefront of providing a sustainable low carbon
economy.
The main sources of renewables in Scotland are hydropower and onshore wind
farms, however, the Scottish government is implementing support schemes for the
development of offshore wind farms, wave power, tidal stream and biomass, of
which a growing level is situated in the north of Scotland. An important aspect of
the challenge lies in connecting these generation facilities to the transmission
network. The construction of the Beauly–Denny HVTL will increase the transmis-
sion capacity between the Highlands and central Scotland and was therefore deemed
important for a successful Scottish Energy Policy (Scottish Government 2010). The
Beauly–Denny line will enable the construction of an interconnection between
Scotland and England—Scotland’s port to export green energy.
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In Scotland, applications to construct new or modify existing grids are made to
the Scottish Ministers. The Energy Consents Unit (ECU) considers all projects
relating to electricity generation facilities and overhead power-lines. Both cases for
and against an application are considered before giving consent, although
particularly sensitive projects are subject to public inquiry. The ECU received the
applications from SHETL and SPT to construct the Beauly–Denny line in
September 2005. One year later, the unit announced that the proposed upgrade
would be subject to a public inquiry. Public consultations, environmental and
technical statements, and evidence from nearly 200 witnesses collected during the
inquiry were considered when making their recommendation of consent.
3.3.2 The sector regulator
The UK regulator of the gas and electricity markets is the Office of Gas and
Electricity Markets (Ofgem). The main priority of the regulator is to protect
customers by promoting competition and regulating (natural) monopolies where
competition is not an alternative. The focus lies in providing Britain with a secure
energy supply and to contribute to limit the energy sector’s adverse environmental
effects. Ofgem regulates the TOs through eight-year price control periods, which
aim to incentivise innovation, efficiency and curb expenditure. The price controls
set the maximum revenue TOs are allowed to generate through transmission levies.7
Major network updates require significant investment from the TOs who seek
approval from Ofgem to raise the capital through increased transmission charges.
The TOs are pressured to minimise the expenditure of any project as Ofgem will
only approve the costs that are clearly justifiable. However, despite claiming that the
interests of the UK consumers are the main priority, Ofgem does not operate within
a framework that allows for consumer participation (Littlechild 2012). Moreover,
the formal rules within this framework may not have been created to be socially
efficient (North 1995). North suggests that institutional rules are designed to benefit
those with the bargaining power to effect change. In the context of grid development
the TOs, relative to communities, are the players with the bargaining power; they
are rich in capital and resources and have all the experience in the planning and
execution of grid development.
Although the Beauly–Denny line is argued to be an important infrastructure
development project to maintain competition and enable development of renewable
energy, it is not officially considered a national necessity for promoting competition
and protection of consumers, and is thus outside the price control allowance. In
2004, Ofgem presented a mechanism designed to fund transmission projects specific
to connecting renewable generation. The Transmission Investment for Renewable
Generation mechanism (TIRG) is comprised by four projects, one of them is
Beauly–Denny. The mechanism allows for an accelerated process to fund these
projects and thus fast-tracking the connection of renewable energy sources to the
national grid (Ofgem 2011).
7 Transmission levies form part of the end-user’s energy bill.
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3.3.3 Scottish Hydro Electric Transmission Ltd (SHETL) and Scottish Power
Transmission Ltd (SPT)
Through their transmission licences, the TOs are responsible for providing a secure
and reliable service to their customers. Part of this service is identifying, planning
and designing new power-lines, which also requires them to produce an
environment report to show Ofgem and the ECU that their proposal is justified
and that all possible alternatives have been considered.
The incentives for efficiency in the private sector are more powerful relative to
the public sector because of external competition. Private companies typically
follow the objective of minimising short-term costs and maximising long-term
profits. However, the TOs are natural monopolies and despite Ofgem’s regulation,
following Dixit (2002), it seems realistic to suggest that where there is a lack of
competition, little attention is paid to consumer preferences. Therefore on the
surface it seems as though the TOs incentives for substantial public engagement are
weak.
SHETL maintains that the construction of the Beauly–Denny line is vital to the
future of the Scottish transmission network. Further developments, including
generation facilities and additional transmission lines, depend on successful and
timely construction. As licence holders, SHETL are responsible for ensuring a
secure and reliable supply of electricity at reasonable prices and they argue that their
license could be in jeopardy if they do not deliver (Personal interview 1 2012).
Although the Beauly–Denny line is mainly covered by SHETL’s area of
responsibility, SPT realises the importance of the project for future connections,
many of which will occur in SPT area (Personal interview 2 2012). Consequently,
Ofgem has granted SHETL and SPT the right to recover the cost of the project from
their customers through transmission levies. The nature of the industry makes
investments in transmission lines relatively safe although there is a certain
regulatory risk. These major investments, where the value is in the actual asset
rather than its usage, will be at risk if the regulator decides to change the rules of the
sector.
3.3.4 Local communities
Community involvement in the planning process is relatively limited. Although
invited to comment on draft proposals, communications with local stakeholders are
more educational than a two-way information exchange. The communities are
characterised by a heterogeneous pattern and also belong to the public sector. They
consist of many and diverse individuals and local firms with different preferences
that can also change over time. Their targets and objections are therefore difficult to
contract and customers may not be willing or able to adequately reflect the interests
of present and future customers (Littlechild 2012).
The general consent among the communities was that not enough effort was
directed towards identifying alternative solutions to the routing, such as sub-sea
cables or not enough measures to mitigate adverse effects. It should be noted that
community opposition to a grid project may be motivated by the type of proposed
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technical solution for example in the use of overhead lines instead of underground
cables. Community groups, including Stirling before pylons (2012) and Pylon
pressure (2010), argued for undergrounding as the only reasonable level to mitigate
the impact on wildlife, environment, and limit the visual landscape. However,
undergrounding is not the panacea to limit all objections. For example, a section of
the Beauly–Denny line crosses over an old battlefield, restricting any construction at
the site.
Also, some communities felt unfairly treated as the new developments only
inferred costs for them and the benefits are enjoyed somewhere else. They consider
the transmission line as substantially reducing the quality of the environment they
live in and thus a reduction in quality of life. The long-term objectives of the
government to export electricity through a Scotland-England connection intensify
the resistance. Further concerns relate to a loss of tourism and therefore a loss of
business.
The potential direct benefits of transmission lines for the communities include
local job creation and the increased demand of local goods and services throughout
the construction phase. However, as the construction of transmission lines is a
highly specific task that requires skilled labour, it is clear that the level of local jobs
actually created were limited. Much of the construction was carried out by
international teams specialised in lining and on site pylon construction.
3.3.5 Third party interests
At a general level, there is strong support for green technology but at local levels
there has been frequent controversy and opposition in relation to the actual
developments. This has become a phenomenon known as NIMBYism (‘not in my
back yard’). However it is wrong to assume that proximity to the developments is
the only factor determining opposition. Often there are objections in relation to
developments being too costly; having potentially damaging effects on wildlife and
ecosystems; and having a visual burden on the landscape. Such third party
objections lead to stalling at the planning stage and reduce the speed of
development. For example, non-governmental organisations often develop blanket
policies in relation to infrastructural development. Therefore even when they are not
directly affected, their experience and resources can provide robust opposition to
controversial developments.
A number of NGOs and environmental preservation groups became involved in
the Beauly–Denny project. Based on the economic case for the project and the
possibilities for green energy, organisations such as ‘‘friends of the earth Scotland’’
and WWF were supportive of the new development. However NGOs with interests
in preserving wildlife, biodiversity and a scenic landscape were generally opposed
to the construction of the new power-line. These NGOs were also more vocal and
involved in the public inquiry.
The NGOs challenge the necessity of the project to a greater extent relative to the
communities. The John Muir trust argued that the need for the new line was poorly
justified and that the strategic case for the chosen route lacked backing. Rather than
a new line, they wanted to see an update of current lines, such as the east coast line.
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The John Muir trust maintains a general renewable energy developments policy,
which is in favour of a greater focus on small-scale, sensitively sited renewable
energy schemes close to existing settlements rather than large scale wind and hydro
plants which connect to the transmission network (JMT 2011). Moreover, the
Beauly–Denny Landscape Group8 took part in the public inquiry and produced a
parliamentary briefing, arguing against the case. Part of their concern was related to
the future effects of the transmission line, such as the upsurge of applications to
develop wind farms along its path.
3.4 Public engagement in planning of the Beauly–Denny project
Statutory requirements oblige SHETL and SPT to advertise their applications in the
local press and planning authorities must be notified: Along the Beauly–Denny line
these include Stirling Council, Perth and Kinross Council, the Highland Council and
the Cairngorms National Park Authority. Further notifications were sent to Scottish
Natural Heritage (SNH) and the Scottish Environment Protection Agency (SEPA).
Objections were received from Stirling Council, Perth and Kinross Council, the
Highland Council and the Cairngorms National Park Authority and 17250 others. A
further 2994 objections were received after the Inquiry closed (Scottish Government
2011).
3.4.1 Heterogeneous understanding among communities
Communication with communities at an initial stage of the planning process is a
way to introduce planned extensions and increase communities understanding and
knowledge of projects. Public understanding of transmission networks and
transmission owners are generally low, as identified by Devine-Wright et al.
(2010), and as experienced by both SHETL and SPT in the Beauly–Denny project.
The members of the SSE Community Liaison Team9 noticed great differences
among the affected communities. The communities that were more familiar with
electricity transmission and generation facilities, such as hydroelectric generation,
were generally more understanding and sympathetic to the idea of the new power-
line. These communities were more open as well as able to actively contribute to the
planning process. This supports the findings of Soini et al. (2011) and Atkinson et al.
(2006), which suggests that the negative attitudes towards overhead power-lines
dissipates over time. It also highlights the importance of provision of information to
increase public understanding of the projects.
8 The John Muir trust joined the Association for the Protection of Rural Scotland, Mountaineering
Council of Scotland, National Trust for Scotland, Ramblers Association Scotland and the Scottish Wild
Land Group to form the Beauly–Denny Landscape group.
9 Following the identification of the need for a close working relationship between the TOs and the
communities, SSE implemented the SSE Community Liaison Team in 2009.
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3.4.2 Uneven playing field among stakeholders
Apart from the advertisement in the local press, SHETL and SPT are only required
to notify planning authorities of the affected communities in the public consulta-
tions. As such, the communities are communicated to rather than consulted. Without
a formal forum to make their voices heard, communities organise themselves in
local groups, hold community meetings, run blogs, sign petitions and write letters to
decision-makers. Communities along the Beauly–Denny line invested a great
amount of time and money in their attempt to affect the planning process. During
the public inquiry, communities had the opportunity to present their statements.
However, many community representatives found the process intimidating and
extremely stressful. They were under the impression that the inquiry was simply
something for show rather than a chance to reach agreement. The Beauly–Denny
Landscape Group engaged both engineers and economists to prepare objections
against the technical and economic cases; however it was felt that these were not
adequately taken into account (Personal interview 3 2012). The process is thus not
allowing for public participation where the public and members of the planning unit
can effectively consult and negotiate on a level playing field. This view is shared by
a member of the ECU, who reports of the public inquiry as an inefficient practice
where the bargaining power is mainly with the project developers (Personal
interview 4 2012). Although local stakeholders are invited to give their views, there
is uncertainty regarding how much the government and developers listen. This
confirms the findings of North (1994) mentioned earlier that it is the party with the
better bargaining power that will benefit most from such institutional rule like a
public inquiry.
3.4.3 Financial compensation to achieve increased acceptance
The use of compensation methods in connection with major infrastructure projects
are relatively common and are often related to loss revenue and land to those
directly affected. These methods can take a number of different forms.10 In this
context, some developers have presented innovative instruments such as offering
corporate bonds by the Dutch grid company TenneT in Germany to those affected
by the projects (GRID ICT 2016). Tobiasson and Jamasb (2014) explore the
limitations of and the more delicate issues that tend to arise when, as in the case of
grid development, compensation is also considered for those indirectly affected.
In the case of the Beauly–Denny project, communities with experience of
generation facilities often expected some level of financial compensation (Personal
interview 1 2012). The question of compensation was also raised during the public
inquiry and on community blogs where communities pointed towards successful
cases of community benefits provided to host communities of wind farms in
Denmark (Pylon pressure 2010). Expressed disappointment over the fact that
10 See World Bank (2012) and RGI (2015) for a generic overview of the topic and compensation methods
in infrastructure projects.
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compensatory measures were not even considered for the Beauly–Denny project,
and transmission lines more generally, was also noted.
Representatives from SPT argued that there was no revenue margin to absorb
increased expenditures from community compensations. Since it is essentially the
UK consumers that finance the project, making them pay for something that is not
economically viable will not be approved in the Ofgem framework (Personal
interview 1 2012). As part of the consent, SHETL were ordered to pay
compensation on two occasions to affected communities. These measures were
mandatory and thus Ofgem approved the costs of the compensations to be raised
through transmission levies.
3.5 Discussion and policy implications
In the present paper we have shown that the economic method can contribute
towards better framing and resolution of conflicts arising from large infrastructure
projects such transmission grid developments. Settlement of such multi-party
conflicts with divergent interests requires more than a simple transactional
approach—for example, the use of financial compensations or similar payments.
Instead, we adopted elements of a new institutional economics view of such
conflicts. We were therefore able to place a better focus on the importance of the
rules and norms of the wider planning and regulatory framework within which the
stakeholders, including the local communities, interact and settle their disputes.
3.5.1 Public participation in the Beauly–Denny project
The study of the Beauly–Denny project supports the findings of previous studies
where the public contribution is at a stage downstream in the decision-making
process and thus of little influence (see Littlechild 2012; Cotton and Devine-Wright
2010). The communities did not consider the public inquiry as a sufficient forum to
argue their case and saw it as just a fac¸ade, simply an attempt to calm local
opposition. In order for public engagement to be effective, it has to enter the early
stages of a project, at a stage upstream the decision-making process. SHETL
realised the need for increased community engagement and created the Community
Liaison Team. However, not until after the public inquiry had taken place and thus
long after the main bulk of oppositions had been received.
Engagement at the later stages of planning provides little scope for the potential
to influence the outcome and leaves communities feeling ignored. Meanwhile, if
introduced at the early stages, the integration of public engagement can improve the
possibility of a successful and excelled implementation of projects (Cotton and
Devine-Wright 2010). Local involvement in the design and implementation of a
project increases local understanding and support, and may assist in accelerating
planning and development (Herbertson et al. 2009).
Furthermore Arrow (1974) notes that decision making, particularly for issues
where no markets exist to determine a price, requires collective action. A number of
cases are discussed in Littlechild (2012) where negotiated settlements have proven
highly successful in the US and Canadian regulated markets; agreements are
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reached faster more efficiently and at a greater social outcome. An important aspect
is the level of trust between communities, government and developers. If
communities are taken seriously and listened to at the start of a project and
throughout, the level of trust for developers increases. In turn, this increases the
likelihood of successful communications and lowers the rise of conflicts. A higher
level of trust between the stakeholders can facilitate bargaining and reduce
transaction costs and is thus more likely to generate successful principal-agent
relationships.
The experience from the Beauly–Denny project has significantly changed the
way SHETL view and approach new grid developments. A new transmission line
linking Caithness and Moray will feature over 160 km of underground and subsea
cable. For this project the communities and stakeholders were involved from the
start stage. In the process, the subsea/undergrounding solution was identified and
ultimately favoured over an overhead line.
3.5.2 Specific knowledge as precondition for effective contribution
Allowing communities to take a more active role in the planning process should be
done if the benefits, for example, accelerated development, outweigh the costs such
as potential financial increases from the negotiation process. Communities along the
Beauly–Denny line felt as if their opinions were not taken seriously and felt left out,
partly because they simply did not have the relevant information and knowledge
about the planning process. It has been recognised that consumers at a general level
lack knowledge of the grid, which can limit their contribution in the planning
process (Devine-Wright et al. 2010; Soini et al. 2011; Littlechild 2012).
Knowledge and experience are two important aspects of grid development and
planning yet the consumers do not require more know-how than the responsible
planning unit. It may therefore be a case for educating, perhaps not the whole
communities, but their representatives as a community consultation group. More
importantly though is that the future framework and process is transparent and that
information is easily available to all stakeholders. The roles and tasks of
stakeholders should be clearly stated before commencing new projects, an
undertaking which may involve policy changes on a governmental level. This
minimises information asymmetries and thus transaction costs.
4 Conclusions
Increased electricity generation from renewable sources is expected to play a key
role in achieving climate change policy objectives. However, the current network
infrastructure is not well suited for the purpose, requiring both expansion and
modernisation to allow a connection of the new facilities to networks. Public
opposition to transmission network developments arise due to conflicts of interests
between stakeholders. The lack of information provision, transparency and
communication cause uncertainty in local communities, which lead to financial,
political and social strains and some projects ultimately being aborted (see Best
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Grid 2015). This is an issue in the UK and across the EU. The conventional
decision-making and planning procedures seem to have failed to incorporate the
relevant stakeholders effectively, thus generating stakeholder conflicts and oppo-
sition from affected parties, including local communities. Providing a secure and
reliable network, including connecting renewable sources to the grid, is important to
ensure a sustainable green energy future.
This paper has outlined the main issues faced by transmission developments and
by applying economic thinking we have identified the potential and shortcomings of
the planning process and stakeholder interactions. The case study of the Scottish
Beauly–Denny project, conducted through both, first hand interviews and secondary
information confirms the findings of the previous studies and showcase a
representative modern transmission development. The communities along the
transmission line felt ignored, excluded and disappointed of lacking communication
from developers and government alike. Communities and involved NGOs’ wishes
to have been informed of the planned project and consulted at an earlier stage,
allowing them more time to process the available information, prepare their own
statements and put forward own evidence.
These testimonies illustrate the importance of increased community involvement
at an early stage of the planning process. Public contribution is found to be at a stage
downstream in the decision-making process and thus of little influence. However, if
introduced at the early stages, the integration of public engagement can improve the
possibility of a successful and excelled realisation of projects as local involvement
in the design and implementation can increase local understanding and support.
Moreover, trust between communities, developers and government is important for
future negotiations and can be achieved through transparency and set guidelines for
stakeholder engagement in the planning process. If communities are taken seriously
and listened to at the start of a project and throughout, the level of trust for
developers increases. In turn, this increases the likelihood of successful commu-
nications and lowers the rise of conflicts.
Furthermore, the paper detected that the planning process of grid developments is
highly specific and requires certain knowledge and experience. For communities to
understand and effectively contribute, as a consequence, it could be reasonable to
specifically educate representatives from the community forming a community
consultation group. Transparency in the process is likely to increase trust between
stakeholders, which would increase the potential success of future consultations. In
policy developments, governments must recognise the link between strong public
engagement and public support and allow communities the possibility to influence
planning and development.
However, it is yet to be observed and explored how similar projects proceed and
whether or not the same problems and difficulties occur. It is to be expected that
from a larger number of case studies more general conclusions can be drawn.
Moreover, the potential for financial compensation in transmission projects provides
the basis for further research. Opposition groups vented their disappointment of the
lack of compensation, comparing their situation to communities hosting wind farms,
which are regularly compensated through benefit schemes. In principle and in
theory, the redistribution of costs and benefits to reach socially desirable outcomes
Econ Polit Ind (2016) 43:105–126 121
123
is a viable and seeming solution, yet its application in practice provides numerous
obstacles. Further research is therefore required to establish the scope and perhaps
the most efficient form of financial compensation, including the separation of assets.
This offers a platform for further research into the economic aspects of the issues
faced in infrastructural development.
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Appendix 1
The landscape along the Beauly–Denny route
Beauly to Fort Augustus
This 50 km section is predominantly routed in unpopulated moorland and forests.
Several rivers and valleys are crossed the current substations at Beauly, Fasnakyle
and Fort August will all be redeveloped.
Fort August to Tummel Bridge
This 77 km section crosses the Grampian Mountains, areas of remote moorland,
coniferous forests and river valleys. The route will follow the A9 a new substation
near Tummel Bridge will be constructed.
Tummel Bridge to Braco
This 63 km section crosses moorland, rivers, valleys and the low-lying landscape
near Crieff and Muthill. A new substation will be constructed near Braco,
surrounded by forest and moorland.
Braco to Denny
This 30 km section crosses the Allan Water and the A9 before crossing moorland
and the Ochil Hills. The route will cross a flat valley of the River Fourth but will
avoid the main settlements as this is the most populated section of the route. A new
substation will be constructed to the north-east of Denny.
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